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Abstract
If one abstracts from specially organized markets like stock or com 
modity exchanges international trade relies on bargaining between the
interested parties Whereas earlier the results of bargaining were seen as
unpredictable or determined by an at most vaguely dened concept of rel 
ative bargaining power it is simply a eld of application in view of game
theory Our discussion tries to elaborate the specic institutional aspects
of international bargaining with interacting parties from dierent countries
Especially we concentrate on the problem when contracts resulting from
international bargaining are unenforceable
  Introduction
Traditionally the theory of international trade has been dominated by extending
general equilibrium analysis  ie by assuming competitive markets in all countries
without international factor mobility  but more or less international mobility of
products This led to wellknown reasons for international trade like comparative
cost advantages  elaborated by the pure theory of international trade Notice 
however  that international trade can already be triggered by dierent market
organization in dierent countries An extreme case would be a centrally planned
economy facing a market economy Here the centrally planned economy would
choose its optimal point on the oer curve of the market economy and thereby
induce international trade even when the two countries are otherwise completely
identical Gth  	

Recently we experience quite a change in the theory of international trade Instead
by general equilibrium analysis it is now dominated by the theory of industrial
organization which  in turn  is dominated by the use of non
cooperative game
theory In essence  the new models of international trade are oligopoly markets
with sellers and customers from dierent countries The advantages of this change
are institutionally richer models of international trade  its pitfalls are those of
neglecting general equilibrium eects Clearly  the latter are relatively harmless
when considering special products whose shares in the national gross product
are relatively low If not partial analysis may neglect some of the most crucial
consequences
Especially in view of this recent development one can ask which role game theory
plays or can play when studying international cooperation  eg in the form of
international trade To avoid reviewing all the recent literature which often can
be interpreted as a game theoretic analysis of international markets with agents
from dierent countries we discuss merely the bargaining aspects which arise in
such international cooperation

There are rare market institutions like stock or commodity exchanges where one
can engage in trade without having to bargain about the terms of trade Given
such institutions there also do not exist specic problems of international trade
Here we do not consider such highly organized markets  but concentrate on mar
kets where the terms of trade are the result of international negotiations
In view of game theory bargaining is an application of game theoretic methods
Whereas in cooperative game theory the model abstracts from individual behav
ior  noncooperative models of bargaining rely on highly specic rules concerning
the bargaining process and the information conditions of the interacting parties
Since we do not simply review bargaining theory see  for instance  Bester   
Gth    Osborne and Rubinstein  
  but try to focus on the specic in
stitutional aspects of international negotiations  we rely on the latter approach
Whereas cooperative game theory simply assumes  for instance  perfect contract
enforcement  we think that international cooperation often cannot rely on contract
enforcement
 Problems when cooperating across borders
If the cooperating parties who bargain about the details of their cooperative ven
ture live in dierent countries  certain institutional aspects will become more
crucial  if not be new There is  of course  the problem of being able to com 
municate at all which  in modern times  has become more negligible although in
international aairs one often struggles about what certain contract clauses imply 
eg legally The senderreceivergame can be used to illustrate that cooperation
requires some basic kind of language
Sender Receiver Games Let    fw
 
    w
T
g denote the nite set of states
w     of the world with T   Whereas the sender S observes the true state
w     of the world  the receiver R must choose the action a   A yielding the
same expected
 utility u a w for both players R and S Before choosing a   A
player R receives a message m   M sent to him by S For the sake of simplicity

let us assume that there are as many dierent messages as states of the world  ie
j j  jM j  T   and that for every two dierent states w
 
  w
  
    of the world
the optimal actions a
 
w
 
   a
  
w
  
   A are dierent what implies jAj  T 
Eective Cooperation in Sender Receiver Games requires only a kind of
language m w in the sense that for all w     sender S can signal by m the
actually prevailing state w Given such a language receiver R will choose the
optimal action a m
 
m w for all messages m   M by decoding it correctly
according to w  m
 
m w
Clearly  one will not speak of bargaining if people are able to communicate in such
an elementary way  ie cooperation per se does not lead to bargaining Whether
and how such an elementary language develops can be analysed in an evolutionary
way Blume  Kim  and Sobel    Wrneryd  

Although at least for Western Europe this will become less important in the next
millennium  international cooperation often means that at least one party has to
accept foreign currency Of course  in modern times one can avoid the currency
risks involved But one has to pay a risk premium which is nonexistent if all
parties are living in the same currency region
Similarly  international cooperation in the form of trade usually is burdened by
transportation costs in the widest sense  eg those implied by customs controls
etc But again modern means of transportation have reduced the cost share of
transportation considerably  for Germany it would be still much cheaper to
import hard coal from the USA than to provide it nationally But it is still
true that certain products implying high transportation cost like sand or cement
are mostly regionally  ie often nationally supplied whereas international trade
concerns mainly products where the cost share of transportation is relatively low
Game theoretic or experimental studies of bargaining can easily incorporate such
institutional aspects and investigate their implications for the likelihood as well as
for the protability of international cooperation One also needs empirical eld

studies by which one tries to assess institutional obstacles  eg requirements in
national law which mainly are to
 discourage foreign competitors  or to measure
the additional cost of international cooperation econometrically
An aspect where one con hardly expect much help from such studies is incomplete
information as  for instance  implied by communicating at least partly in a foreign
language or resulting from cultural dierences for an experimental analysis of
cultural dierences see  for instance  Roth et al  

Incomplete information essentially means that the negotiation rules are not
commonly known A party may not know the true incentives of its partners 
their information conditions or even the time structure of the decision process
In his pioneering contribution John C Harsanyi 		
 has shown that all
these information deciencies can be translated into uncertainties concerning the
other parties types  ie their cardinal
 utility functions and  more importantly 
that such type uncertainty can be transformed into stochastic uncertainty by
including ctitious chance moves whose results are only partially revealed as to
capture the type uncertainty of certain players
Gth and Selten 
 have tried to elaborate how such type uncertainty can
inuence the bargaining process A party which wants to appear as a superior
type will try to gain such a reputation see also Kreps  Milgrom  Roberts  and
Wilson  
 by mimicing the superior types behavior Often the superior type
will  however  be able to distinguish itself from inferior types by providing a risk
proof of its superiority  eg by risking conict with positive probability due to
not conceding  a risk from which inferior types would shy away
Clearly  national identy reduces the degree of uncertainty regarding the other
parties types Cultural transfers and the  in modern times  much better knowl
edge of foreign cultures due to international exchanges via travelling abroad and
via the modern mass media have  however  greatly reduced the degree of uncer 
tainty about foreign cultures Mostly it seems more important to nd the
right partners within a country than the right country for international coopera
tion  ie incomplete information is dominated by invidual dierences rather than
by cultural ones that this may be task dependent is suggested by Roth et al 



 Cooperation without contract enforcement
Let us now concentrate on a more dramatic aspect of international cooperation 
at least in its early days  namely the nonexistence or practical impossibility
of contract enforcement To demonstrate this let us refer to the most recent
past when the Iron Curtain was still existent If an Eastern European partner
did not fulll its obligations  its Western European partner would hardly engage
in a legal dispute It  much more likely  would have tried to exert pressure by
political means  eg by trying to employ the foreign oce If also this is im
possible or would not pay the eort  international cooperation appears similar to
cooperation in anarchy to which we now turn our attention
a Interacting repeatedly
Game theory oers some possibilities to enable cooperation even when contracts
are not enforceable If the partners interact repeatedly  one way of inducing
the agreed upon behavior is to terminate cooperation the grim strategy
 or at
least to interrupt it suciently long Due to the Folk Theorem players can coop
erate eciently by relying on such threats which are selfenforcing eg Aumann 

 One can question the relevance of the Folk Theorem  which requires an
innite horizon and does not only justify ecient outcomes  but nearly
 every
outcome which is individually rational  as well as its normative justication Gth 
Leininger  and Stephan  

Empirically one does not need innitely many rounds to engage in mutually prof
itable cooperation see  for instance  the respective experimental results of Selten
and Stcker  	  for the case of  rounds
 Inspired by such experimental re
sults an alternative game theoretic justication of selfenforcing cooperation relies
on a nite horizon  but introduces type uncertainty If my partner expects me
with positive probability to suer from breeching contract  since it is not justied
at all why my partner may think so  one often speaks of crazy perturbations
  I myself might try to appear like this strange alter ego although I am com
pletely opportunistic In essence this will mean that I will be cooperative with

high probability at the beginning and try to fool my partner when approaching
the end of interaction
Whoever has tried to actually compute such a reputation equilibrium Kreps
et al  
 will wonder how one can expect boundedly rational human decision
makers to derive their behavioral plans in such a way see  for instance  McKelvey
and Palfrey  
 More importantly  certain aspects of the experimentally ob
served behavior are inconsistent with the qualitative properties of reputation equi
libria which predict  for instance  continued conict after a transient breakdown
of cooperation whereas actual players engage in attempts to restore cooperation
b The case of no repetition or the game of trust
In general  international cooperation may not be repetitive at all since depending
on changing world market prices it is often better to cooperate with somebody in
country A today  but in country B tomorrow what may be  furthermore  rather
unpredictable Is there no chance of one shotcooperative endeavors when con
tracts are unenforceable In the following this will be discussed with the help of
the basic game of trust as thoroughly discussed by Gth and Kliemt  
  

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Figure 
In the basic game of trust two partners  player a from country A and player b
from country B  can either not cooperate if a chooses N
 or cooperate with a
	
delivering rst his move T 
 When a has revealed trust by choosing T 
  player
b can either reward him the move R
 or exploit a by choosing E
 Since r
i
 s
i
for i  a  b cooperation in the sense of the play T R is ecient and payo
dominates noncooperation N which  however  is implied by the unique solution
behavior N T  in the sense of subgame perfect equilibria Selten  	 and 

or of strategies surviving once repeated elimination of dominated strategies In
this sense the basic game of trust paradigmatically illustrates the impossibility of
cooperation when contracts are unenforceable
c On the evolution of morals in international trade
Gth and Kliemt     
 interprete the basic game of trust as repre
senting just the monetary incentives But although money seems to rule the world 
it is not the only thing we care for Imagine player b who considers to exploit his
trustful partner a after he has chosen T  Will b easily enjoy his exploitative prot
of  or will he feel remorse Instead of simply imposing such feelings of remorse or
not Gth and Kliemt ask whether or not such feelings would evolve by employing
ideas of evolutionary game theory see Hammerstein and Selten    for a
general survey
 Unlike in evolutionary game theory they  however  do not study
the evolution of strategies  ie behavior  but rather the indirect evolution
 of
preference types like Gth and Yaari 

Their simple means of doing so is to substitute player bs exploitation prot of 
by his more complex payo m where m stands for moral feelings of remorse if
negative or for enjoyment of exploitation a sucker is born every day and I found
him
 if positive Unlike the other payo parameters the payo component
m is completely immaterial  ie it motivates bs decision  but does not directly
determine his material and therefore evolutionary success Depending on m the
solution is T R in case of m  r
b
    and N E in case of m  r
b
 
Experimental evidence for the existence of prohibitive mparameters is mixed
Gth  Ockenfels  and Wendel 
 observed only little trust  which was generally
exploited  in an experiment granting entitlement and oering a very high monetary
exploitation incentive r
b
 Keren and Snijders    observed considerably more
trust and reward of trust but only for negligible monetary incentives

Since parameter changes within the halfintervals m  r
b
  and m  r
b
  are
obviously without consequence  let us assume that there are only two realizations
possible for  namely m  r
b
  and m   Which of the two values has to be
expected to prevail in the long run when evolutionary success solely depends on
monetary prot
The result can be easily detected from the table specifying the expected success of
m
 
  fm mg for every m
 
 m

constellation with m
i
  fm mg for i     The
entries of this table are derived under the assumption that a type m
i
assumes
both roles that of player a and that of player b
 with equal probability If  for
instance   is of type m
 
 m and  of type m

 m  the play T R results if
m

 m becomes b whereas the play N occurs if m
 
 m becomes b so that
m
 
 m earns the expected r
a
 s
b
  The other components of the table can
be derived analogously
m

 m m

 m
m
 
 m s
a
 s
b
  r
a
 s
b
 
m
 
 m s
a
 r
b
  r
a
 r
b
 
Since r
i
 s
i
for i  a  b the m
 
 mtype always expects more than the m
 
 m
type regardless whether he confronts a monomorphic m

 m or m

 m
population from which m

is drawn Thus mtypes are always more successful
and will only survive in the long run In other words When the mtypes are
commonly known what has implicitly been assumed in our derivations  the only
evolutionarily stable mtype is the one of prohibitive remorse feeling enabling
mutually protable international cooperation even without contract enforcement
d On possible generalizations
It has already been mentioned above that type information will usually be less
reliable in international aairs The assumption of commonly known mtypes ap
pears therefore rather questionable in this context Unfortunately  if one assumes

mtypes to be private information and beliefs concerning others types to be gov
erned by the true population composition  the above result is completely reversed
see Gth and Kliemt       for details
 The only evolutionarily sta
ble population composition is the mmonomorphic one excluding any cooperation
based on trust
 Prospects of international cooperation in case of costly
type detection
Incomplete information must not be accepted Gth and Kliemt  and 

prove that in case of costly detection there may exist an evolutionarily stable
bimorphism  ie a population containing both  m and mtypes in positive pro
portions The basic intuition for this result is that there must be sucient type
uncertainty to render the investment in detection protable and that in case of
more or less reliable detection mtypes are more successful than mtype like in
the border case of commonly known mtypes
The results when type information can be obtained by investing in type detection
are graphically illustrated in Figure  in the p  Cdiagram where p is the share of
mtypes in the population and C the cost of type detection


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C
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Figure 
For cost levels C  C type detection is too costly Thus mtypes remain pri
vate information what implies that mtypes fare better than mtypes and that

p converges to p

   the only evolutionarily stable population composition for
C  C
In case of C  C the nal result depends on the starting point  ie what nally
happens is path dependent Within the triangle of Figure  one invests in type
detection since its costs are nonprohibitive and since the population is suciently
mixed to render type information suciently valuable When type information
is available  mtypes are more successful than mtypes what explains why the
arrows within the triangle are pointing to the right  ie p increases over time
To the left and to the right side of the triangle in Figure  one does not invest
in type detection since there is not enough type uncertainty to render such an
investment protable Thus one obtains similar consequences as for C  C  ie
p decreases over time
So for cost levelsC  C one has two evolutionarily stable pcongurations  namely
the mmonomorphic population with p

  or the bimorphic population p


p C whose population share p C of trustworthy partners increases when C
decreases
Whenever the starting point p

is to the left of p C or when C  C  the process
ends with p

   whereas it ends with p

 p C for C  C and p

 p C The
set of attraction for the stable congurations p

 p C is thus as illustrated in
Figure  whereas p

  results if one starts outside of the p

 p Cattraction
set
If the type information from investing in type recognition is informative  but
not certain  ie in case of stochastic type signals  the triangle in Figure 
shrinks In Figure  the larger triangle represents the case of more informative
type detection If type information becomes more reliable  this
 increases the share p

 p C for a given cost level C of type detection 
 generates the new evolutionarily stable conguration p

 p C for the
generic interval from C
 
to C
  
of cost levels C


C
C
                                                                                                                 
 

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
 
attraction set
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
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p
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Figure 
 Policy measures improving the prospects of international
cooperation
Based on our analysis in section  we want to analyse policy measures by which
one can improve the prospects of international cooperation which is endangered
by type uncertainty Like in our discussion above uncertainty about the second
movers type in the game of trust may  however  be reduced by investing in costly
type detection In principle  policy could inuence parameter values by
i measures which move the starting point p

into the attraction set of p

 p C
as illustrated in Figure  
ii lowering the cost C of type detection so that p

  C lies in the attraction set
of p

 p C 
iii improving the reliability of type detection what increases the triangle as
shown in Figure 

Measures of type i
 essentially require an increase of the initial proportion p

of
trustworthy mtypes In addition to wellknown measures like education and pun
ishing or stigmatizing exploiters it could mean to start international cooperation
only when trustworthiness is suciently large
The obvious means for ii
 are to provide type information freely  eg by the
diplomatic services  or at least to subsidize all attempts to learn more about
potential foreign partners Also requirements for selfrevelation  eg by asking to
publish a rms main characteristics like the amount of equity  present prots etc
can reduce the cost of type detection
The reliability of type detection can be improved by means which allow to base
a detectives type assessment on more reliable indicators  eg by granting access
to a rms accounts etc It seems that generally all requirements for transparency
in economic and political life could be viewed as policy measures in the sense of
iii

A further policy measure would be to guarantee contract enforcement by inter 
national courts whose verdicts are binding  ie require supporting national law
This will certainly help to exclude major risks But since contracts are mostly
incomplete  even enforceable contracts will allow for opportunistic exploitation
Thus international courts may levy the obstacles of international cooperation  but
cannot avoid them totally Like in national cooperation one needs trustworthy
partners since legal verdicts are often impossible  too costly  or too late in eect
Actually Brennan  Gth  and Kliemt a and b
 have introduced the
possibility of litigation when a has been exploited Interesting aspects of their
analysis is that judges are not better  ie they judge according their mtype
so that the moral evolution also changes the reliability of the legal system  and
their analysis whether legal enforcement will crowd out or crowd in intrinsic
motivation in the sense of mtypes satisfying m  r
b
   

 Conclusions
Our modest aim was to discuss the most important institutional aspects which
one encounters in international negotiations Some of them were briey discussed
whereas the nonexistence of contract enforcement has been explored more thor
oughly by relying on the previous results of Gth and Kliemt     and

 Another speciality of our analysis above is that we do not only explore the
game theoretic solution behavior  but also discuss its predictive success  mainly
by referring to appropriate experimental results
Since bargaining and thus international bargaining is mostly an application of co
operative or  like here  noncooperative
 game model there exists an abundance of
bargaining models Without empirical research trying to nd out the actually used
rules of international negotiations  in politics see  for instance  MautnerMarkhof 

 or in business hardly anything specic can be said The empirical  mainly
experimental study of bargaining behavior for welldened rules of negotiations
has to be supplemented by empirical institutional research nding out the actu
ally applied rules Only with such empirical institutional evidence one can derive
more specic conclusions about the prospects of international cooperation  either
as implications of game theoretic rationality or by empirical  eg experimental
studies
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